

COLL.

VINDICATION

OF

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN C. FREMONT,

AGAINST

THE ATTACKS OF THE SLAVE POWER AND ITS ALLIES,

BY

HON. JOHN P. C. SHANKS,

OF INDIANA,

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 1862.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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# S P E E C H

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The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union—

Mr. SHANKS said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: It is with feelings of much anxiety that I arise, under the peculiar circumstances which surround me, to address this House on the subjects before it.

My purpose is to call the attention of the committee to some of the matters contained in the "Report in part" of the committee on contracts, of which the gentleman from New York [Mr. VAN WYCK] is chairman, only, however, so far as they relate to General John C. Fremont, and then only to a part of those at this time, as I intend, if possible, to take those subjects in detail when that report and accompanying resolutions may come before us.

This "Report in part" was made on the 17th day of December, and has been sent from this House to all parts of the country. Its consideration has been deferred from time to time, until some ten days ago it passed from its character of a special order to a special privilege in the hands of the committee.

The country has had the charges for over two months, and yet not a word of defence from those whose characters have been challenged on testimony taken without notice to them. But since I am compelled to speak in Committee of the Whole, I shall take the privilege thus offered me to draw attention to matters of more general importance to the country, as connected with him of whom I shall speak to-day, still hoping that the time may come when the matters named in the report to which I have referred shall be well known to the House and the country.

The only subject among the several named by the committee, touching the administrative character of General Fremont, which they think worthy to ask special action by the House upon, is in relation to the purchase by him, as commander of the Western Department, for service in his cavalry, of 5,000 new cast-steel

breech-loading Hall's carbines, of Simon Stevens for the sum of \$22 apiece. This pattern of arm was approved years ago, and adopted as a Government weapon; and I learn that a manufactory for its fabrication was established at Harper's Ferry, Va. A copy of the army regulations of 1835 now before me gives the cost in detail of this arm for material and manufacture at \$21; they were then smooth bored. On the 6th day of June, 1861, General Ripley, chief of the ordnance bureau, of this Government, claiming to act under an order from the War Department, which very order the committee say his bureau recommended, sold to a Mr. Eastman 5,400 of these arms for the sum of \$3 50 each—just one-sixth their original cost to the Government. Eastman had proposed to Ripley for an average of \$1 apiece, to chamber and rifle these carbines in the style of the latest improved arm, but Ripley refused it, and got the order on the recommendation of his own department, and sold them as above stated. General Fremont, sorely pressed for arms, having none for his cavalry, and his entire command in need of early organization, wholly neglected by the Government, as I will abundantly prove as I go along, received by telegraph from Stevens the following despatch:

NEW YORK, August 5, 1861.

I have 5,000 Hall's rifled cast-steel carbines, breech-loading, new, at twenty-two dollars, government standard, 58-100 bore. Can I hear from you?

SIMON STEVENS.

J. C. FREMONT.

*Maj. Gen., Com'g Dep't of the West, Cairo, Ill.*

To which the following is an answer:

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

St. Louis, August 6, 1861.

I will take the whole 5,000 carbines. See agent Adams' Express, and send by express; not fast freight. I will pay all extra charges. Send also ammunition. Devote yourself solely to that business to-day.

J. C. FREMONT,

*Major General Commanding.*

SIMON STEVENS, New York.

This is a contract, and if honorably made by the Government's agent, it cannot now afford



to violate it; but in this case I only desire to lay the fault and blame where they belong; for I agree with the committee that there has been a most damnable fraud committed against the Government, but I now insist and will go on to prove that General Ripley is the man who has by his most unaccountable liberality with her much-needed arms, wronged the Government out of them for a nominal sum. The law provides as found "United States military laws" on page 292, approved March 3d, 1825, as follows:

"That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause to be sold any ordnance, arms, ammunition, or other military stores or subsistence, or medical supplies, which upon proper inspection or survey, shall appear to be damaged, or otherwise unsuitable for the public service, whenever in his opinion, the sale of such unserviceable stores will be advantageous to the public service."

It becomes a question whether the President has in the pressing need for arms during a war like the one now upon us, ordered to be sold arms which General Ripley himself in a letter to Mr. Eastman under date of June 20, informing him where to get the carbines which were at arsenals on Governor's Island, N. Y., and Frankfort, Philadelphia, saying that Eastman was to have "all of the Hall's carbines of every description (serviceable and unserviceable) on hand, at the rate of \$3 50 each." I do not believe that the President did give such order; if he did it was on the recommendation of the department contracting them; and I am well convinced that the President did not order *serviceable* carbines at that time to be sold at that price.

The army regulations under date of August 10, 1861, gives the price of Hall's carbines, at \$17 as the cost of material and manufacture, which is four dollars less than in 1835—owing to the improvement in machinery. The carbine will shoot as well now as then, when made in the same way; but in looking over the list of prices of small arms manufactured by the Government, as found on pages 394 and 395, Army Regulations, August 10, 1861, they are as follows: Musket, \$13; rifle, \$13.25; Hall's carbines, \$17; artillery musketoon, \$10.37; cavalry musketoon, \$11; sappers' musketoon, \$10.62; pistol, \$7. But some of those same carbines were purchased here, by those who sold them for \$15. Before Fremont purchased those 5,000, they were all chambered and rifled, making them a superior cavalry piece; and they are now in service by Halleck's cavalry, having been armed by Fremont when he commanded. Now this committee ask this House to recommend the Treasury to only pay \$12.50 for those purchased by Fremont, when the army regulations, dated four days after the purchase, give the price, as shown, at \$17. The committee propose to allow \$4.50 less than the material and manufacture, without the rifling and chambering costs, showing simply that the committee have not understood

the case. Ripley sold them for \$13.50 apiece less than the regulations of August, 1861, fix the actual cost, when there was no pressing need for sale, and Fremont gave after they were altered \$5 more apiece than the Government price then, and only one dollar more than the Government price when he had been in service; yet the committee say that "General Ripley is a gentleman of large experience, and inexorable in the performance of his public duties." On the 12th of April, 1861, the enemy attacked Fort Sumter—on the 14th it surrendered. On the 15th the President called for 75,000 men to quell the rebellion, all of whom would need arms. On the 19th the traitors in Baltimore killed our unarmed troops in the streets. On the 6th of June, the "inexorable" Ripley, on what he claims as authority from the War Department, grounded on a recommendation from his own department, and all in violation of law, sold 5,400 carbines, for \$3 50 each, which the regulation of 1835 tells us are worth \$21 each, and the regulation published August 10th, 1861, sixty-four days after the sale, gives the cost of manufacture at \$17. On the 16th of June we lose Harper's Ferry where they were made, and surrender to the enemy all the arms there, with the machinery. On the 20th of June the carbines are still in the arsenals, not paid for and not delivered. Ripley, by written orders, directed that all, *serviceable* and *unserviceable*, be delivered to Eastman, at \$3.50—subsequently buying 790 of them at \$15.

On August 6th, General Fremont, needing arms for men who were ready to defend a vast department, purchased 5,000 of them at \$22 in open market, where the Government officers had thrown them contrary to law, but of which he knew nothing. On the 10th of August, four days after his purchase, the very department which sold them at \$3 50, report them at \$17 cost of manufacturing in Government arsenals. Yet you condemn Fremont and endorse Ripley, after you have said that the carbines were sold in the first place "privately." I think that the committee will do justice when they see these things in their true light.

But the committee inform us the Ordnance Bureau, at whose head is General Ripley, in time of war recommends the sale, and sells, without law, for one-fifth their value, as shown by the books of his own office, five thousand four hundred stand of arms, with a loss to the Government of near \$73,000, and holds his office still—and who is endorsed by the committee.

Inexperienced, I now approach with hesitancy to attack the cordon of fortifications thrown by experienced hands across the pathways of an honest, pure, devoted patriot for his destruction, to satisfy the ambition of base and corrupt men, who, instead of supporting him, have seized upon the wisdom of his recorded councils and the armies and fleets by him spoken into existence, from which to gather

the laurels due his rightful victories to wreathe their brows, while he wears a crown of thorns.

My purpose is to do an act of justice to one who, though his name and honor stands connected with this report and resolution, was not notified, nor could have been present, when the extra judicial examination was had by the committee upon which they are based. Nor can he be here now to defend himself upon this floor, against the unjust charges and inferences contained in them, against that name which has in this country long been a household word, synonymous with freedom, loved at home, honored and respected abroad.

I well recollect how the grateful thanks of our Western people went forth to meet the President, for the appointment of the brave and generous Fremont to the office of Major General, and in command of the Western Department; how with one accord our young men rallied to the support of the Union, with the cheering hope that he should command them. The energy and perseverance of the people of our Western States have no just comparisons among men. It was not strange, then, that they should look with pride and hope to a commander whose courage, energy, and devotion to liberty, are proverbial throughout the civilized world.

I recollect how it was proclaimed through the public journals, that he was the right man, in the right place.

*That as this war was the result of slavery's treason, freedom's patriotic defender was our proper commander.*

Our Western people are plain in manners, devoted in thought, and prompt in action. With one hope we entered our country's service; politics were forgotten among us; our minds recalled, and our tongues retold the scenes of his past life, and rejoiced that the hour was nigh when (as we then hoped and believed) he should lead us to battle.

Nor have the people been deceived by the many causeless and unjust efforts made by designing persons to destroy their confidence in one of the ablest generals in the American army, and the boldest friend of freedom in the Government service.

Conceal it as you may, misname it as you will, the elements which have combined for General Fremont's destruction, are too apparent to deceive the common sense and quick perception of our intelligent and patriotic people. They see it successfully developed in the designs of the slave power, as manifested towards him by its leaders since his proclamation to the people of Missouri, of August 30, 1861—in a combination of long-known, undermining politicians, and in a bigoted military jealousy. We well know that General Fremont was given his high rank in the army in obedience to the loudly and universally expressed wish of the people, who desired when the Republican party came into power that the ser-

vices of its first representative, the man who had welded it together, under whom it had won its victories in '56, should be recognised. Against this wish to distinguish one of themselves, the very men whom the people had educated into their positions, have set themselves in violent opposition, because he had not received with them the rite of infant baptism at West Point.

Having from my youth learned to combat the world's wrongs and neglects and contend with its privations, I condemn the ingratitude of this class toward him, who only asks of the Government that he be allowed to continue in the active service of his country, leaving impartial history to determine between West Point and Western patriotism.

There are some chronological events which, when understood and recollected, will materially aid in elucidating the positions I am taking in this case, as well as the action of those who strive with so much zeal to crush out every rising hope of him whom they have thus far practically victimized to their ungenerous purposes.

All will recollect the wide-spread national joy which pervaded all classes of *pure, unconditional Union-loving citizens*, when the lightnings told by telegraph that Fremont would take command in our army. He was, by those who *now* denounce him, *then* the brilliant, able, and patriotic son of the West, full of mind, energy, military skill, and promise; and, in fact, these attributes were his before his promotion to command. So by the recognition of all men, and the contrary was not announced until his hand had written the proclamation of August 30, 1861, a portion of which is in the following memorable words, and which places his name in history honorably, and in most pleasing unity with his life from his earlier adventures when he saved the State of California to freedom.

But to the proclamation:

"The property, real and personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri, who shall take up arms against the United States, or who shall be directly proven to have taken active part with their enemies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared free men."

This was the head and front of his offending—the key note on which rallied all the clans in combination against him. It was but a few hours after he had said that traitors' property should help to pay the expenses of the war, forced on us by them, and that their slaves should be free, until from Kentucky and Missouri, from the friends of slavery, who have not risked their lives in this war, came invectives against him and in favor of the cause which wrongs us.

Prior to this time, neglect of the Western department and Western men had been the

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only due to his defeat, then apparent to those who, for sinister motives, sought his ruin.

The proclamation was the opening door at which his enemies entered and made common cause against him. The politician who fears his popularity; the friend to slavery, who prefers that institution even in rebel hands, to the life and prosperity of free, true, and just men, at field, camp, or homestead; the military bigot, who sees West Point first, and after it, the country; and lastly, speculators at the public Treasury, who, themselves guilty and suspected, point the finger of distrust at others—these are the classes in unholy combination against an honest and pure man, *whom they cannot control*, but hope to destroy; and on the principle that a large shelter protects more certainly from the storm, the attack is made on a popular man to more effectually draw public attention, while his assailants running under cover of this temporary check in the current of public thought, in the armistice thus falsely obtained, consummate their combined grasp of public power, regardless of the cost and national ruin, leaving the dissensions which will grow out of a division of spoils to settlement and conditions which the time may afford.

I do not stand here as the partisan of any man. Knowing General Fremont as I do, I love him. I know him to be deliberately brave, and unconditionally patriotic, with a will to act, and a nerve for that will; a mind to comprehend, a judgment to direct, and an ability to execute; pure and honest, with a soul which rises above the groveling walks of the wily politician, the jealous professor of conditional patriotism, the serpentine course of the oppressors of men, and of those Treasury vampires who fasten alike upon individuals and nations, drawing their life-blood, for selfish aggrandizement. He does not anticipate their base machinations, nor prepare to meet them; and when he finds himself basely and cowardly stabbed, assassinated by those who had professed their friendship, he pities the soulless wretches who could inflict the wound, and looks to time and justice for his vindication.

Yet, sir, though I loved and devotedly served under him during his command in the Western department, I did not return with him from Springfield after his relief. Col. Lovejoy of Illinois, Col. Hudson of Indiana, and myself, all members of his staff, chose, and with his full approbation remained with the army, to which he and we were attached by ties stronger than life, and severed only when the army was, under Gen. Hunter, ordered to return where our further association could do no good to either.

I mention this to show that, though cherishing every hope and prospect for General Fremont's just success, I bind my fate and will to no man, only so far as his pathway lies along those lines of justice which Deity draws directly from Him to the hearts of all men; but here,

as elsewhere, I shall enjoy and exercise that freedom of thought and action which is the leading trait in the character of him for whom I speak.

I speak here as a member of this House, fully recognising the duties of that trust, and only desirous that justice be done between the country I serve, and one of her most worthy citizens.

I am not here to ask favors of this House for General Fremont. Such act would be alike unjust to him and the country. As an honest man he could take neither more or less than, by fixed principles of justice between him and his country, are his dues; and the Government well administered will only give to one of her citizens that which under like circumstances she bestows upon another. And, though this be true, General Fremont has, and from the hour of his appointment as Major General had, legally, the highest military rank in the army of the United States, except the President and Lieutenant General Winfield Scott; yet his devotion to his country, his love of order in our councils, his modesty of self defence, and willing submission to the directing power, choosing to lose place, power, property, and life if necessary, rather than distract our forces by jealousies and contentions in this hour of our nation's trials, has made him never so much as demand his rank and place. What I say on this subject I say on my own responsibility, but fully knowing what I say. Over this question of rank even the President has no power, and the position which General McClellan has held in the army is an error over General Fremont's legal rights. He whose energy and wisdom has provided armies, gun-boats, mortar-boats, and written basis for the plans of the present triumphant Western campaign, is discarded by the influence of the combination against him, and slandered by the political scavengers of the country.

Major Generals Fremont and McClellan were appointed the same day; hence, their commissions bear the same date. This would leave them of equal rank. In such cases the military law directs that, to determine the superior rank of one, you ascertain the relative rank of the appointees prior to promotion. This done, we find that McClellan was a captain and Fremont a lieutenant colonel—two grades higher than McClellan. Such is the state of this case. I feel confident that when the President has known his duty in these premises, he will discharge it under the law.

I ask for Fremont JUSTICE—stern and unvarnished. No more, no less. I know nothing personally of any contracts made by the officers of this Government for arms or supplies to be used in the prosecution of this war. Nor have any people engaged in such contracts. I do not now know that any man in my district has a contract with any branch of the War Department, or their agents, for furnishing arms or supplies.

My people are in the service of, but not in the speculations against the Government. They and I stand free, clear, and unincumbered. And for them, for justice, and myself, I stand to defend him against the injustice done by parties in interest.

I have no disposition to assail the committee. It is not my purpose or my duty. The members of the committee are, with myself, members of this House, and are my peers on this floor. I aided in raising this committee, and unlike some of my friends over the way, who make common cause against another committee for special objections, I would vote again for investigating any department of the Government which does not stand above suspicion.

If public papers are being plundered from the White House, investigate it. When campaign maps were furnished, in July last, by traitors in the War Department to the enemy, causing defeat of our army at Bull Run and Manassas, it should have been investigated. When Adjutant General Thomas treasonably published the strength of our army in Kentucky and in Missouri while in the field, giving to the enemy the locality, destination, and numbers of our forces, he should have been tried for treason, condemned and shot by the men whom he betrayed, as a warning to traitors everywhere. Sir, my present complaint against the committee is, that they have not fully investigated the subjects before them. They should have examined both sides of all cases prior to a report. The accused should have been present. Gen. Fremont had no notice of the time, place, or purpose of the committee's sitting. The examination was made when he was in the field, at the head of his army, hundreds of miles from St. Louis where its sessions were held; and that the House may more fully understand the net-work of oppression which has been so dexterously and perseveringly thrown around him by parties in *influence* and power, by directing, neglecting, permitting, or restraining him, controlling his acts, or countermanding his orders in his presence or his absence as seemed to his pursuers most conducive to his injury, I will briefly explain the circumstances under which the testimony in this report relating to him was taken. That portion of it taken in New York was without notice to him and while he was at St. Louis, managing the vast department under his command. And I do not now intend saying of that taken at St. Louis, that it was with a purposed intention to wrong any one; but that either the committee or Fremont was purposely victimized, is apparent to any one who knows the facts and cares to reflect upon them.

On the 10th day of July last, this committee was appointed in accordance with the terms of a resolution offered by Mr. VAN WYCK, now chairman of the committee. This was sixteen days before General Fremont took command of the department of the West.

It was expressly understood from the remarks of the chairman of the committee, made on the introduction of the resolution, that speculations were going on in the War Department at Washington; and this House having raised the committee, would very naturally expect that it should, in a reasonable time, be investigated and reported, particularly so since Secretary Cameron was in his department almost the entire time since the committee was appointed, up to the date of his resignation; and as a member of this body, and one who favors investigation, let me now say here, in my place, that I do hope, if the committee intend to make an investigation of the contracts entered into by the War Department while under the charge of Secretary Cameron, that he shall have notice of the time, place, and purpose of the committee's sitting; that at least his presence may be his privilege. Then, if he fails to show his innocence, the country will apply the censure; and as he is appointed to a foreign mission, let the investigation be had before he leaves the country, and not, as was done in General Fremont's case, when he was in command of his army in the field, far from the committee and from public conveyance, and even then without notice.

But the House must know that this is only one of several committees connected with this case.

Immediately after General Fremont's proclamation was published, an *inquisitorial* committee started from the Federal capital to St. Louis, consisting of Quartermaster General Meigs and Postmaster General Blair. A singular committee to examine a military department! And concurrent with their starting from Washington, notices were inserted in leading journals of the country informing the public that this committee had gone to the West to investigate General Fremont's department; creating the impression that some great wrong had been done there, requiring two such personages, one of them a Cabinet officer, to examine.

And following closely the return of the inquisition to this city, the public journals were filled with the published intention of removing General Fremont for inefficiency. This charge was new to the people, who read in his energy and success a refutation of it. It was new to the world, and it was new to those who invented it; but, like all other "new and useful improvements," the inventors were entitled for a limited time to the benefit of their patent. Let it be borne in mind, however, that this discovery was not made until the proclamation of August 30th was published. Some who were particularly loud in their praise of his ability prior to that publication, were now the first to assail him. They made haste to correspond with political friends and intimate associates here, and were soon in the same conspiracy, clamoring for the fall of the man whom but a few days before they delighted to honor.



The inevitable conclusion in every mind is, that the inquisition and concurrent publications to which I have referred, were but the preparatory steps to do what they knew to be a grave wrong, and which the public mind would not receive until trained to it by a succession of approaches, made upon it from different quarters and influences, which the sequel to this history of wrongs will show to have been most assiduously applied.

Culminating in the "temporary" relief of Fremont from command—retiring of the army from Springfield, followed by robbery and bloodshed over two-thirds of the State—the combination and conspiracy against him was gaining numbers and strength. The force against him had assumed form. Slavery was its centre column; political knavery commanded on the right wing as the post of honor in this most unholy crusade, and on the left were semi-traitors in office and influence, disappointed contractors, and Treasury plunderers.

But the great miscreant in this struggle of wrong against right is slavery; whose advocates, plying with their usual activity and ingenuity, like great and practiced criminals in the commission of fraud, securing its profits, yet avoiding that justice due to the committers of those accursed crimes so long inflicted upon our country; and which have been borne with until we have lost that manhood which God intended all men should have, as a safeguard against wrong and oppression.

The responsibility on the people of this country at this time is a fearful one, and fearfully we will answer it, unless freemen stand up and demand freemen's rights.

The coming Presidential campaign is looked to by those men with the keen perception of long-practiced political schemers. A transposition of the locality of President and Vice President, will, as a political necessity, take place. As the North and South are in conflict, the East and West will be required to change hands upon this question.

Those who cannot expect from this and other reasons to reach the higher, will hope that mere locality may possibly give them the lower of those positions. And knowing that the public mind will be incensed at the accursed cause of slavery which has produced all our national calamities, it becomes necessary to shape that public mind so as to receive another cheat and treason as preliminary to its still further use, by men devoid of that lofty devotion to country which marks the real good man, but yet who rejoice in their unjust successes at the nation's expense and sacrifice; and to effectually do this, it becomes necessary to strike down the man who is himself the consistent and acknowledged representative of that great truth of his proclamation, which finds at this time, regardless of party, a welcome response in the hearts of the Northern people. And knowing that they abhor dishonor in their public servants, his

persecutors shrewdly attempt to fasten that charge upon Fremont by the arts of practiced demagogues and energy of bad men in a bad cause, with the success which follows for a time the efforts of combinations against the single-handed, who, attending to his own duty, does not anticipate or prepare for the associated treason of dishonest men.

I know that the combination is a strong one, and that General Fremont, because a friend of freedom, is the sacrifice to be offered by authority on the altar of his country as a peace-offering to the slave power. It is but the first step of that march to degradation which you will all soon recognise; for the want of nerve and manhood to repel the aggressors and to sustain Fremont in his proclamation will come upon us from this same combination, which is one for power and place; and when this war is ended, with rebel slavery protected by the Government, those slaveholding traitors will turn upon you in these Halls, denounce your brave soldiers as a rabble, and rejoice at the blood they have spilled. Under the protection of the flag they have desecrated and torn, they will lash their slaves to daily toil—protected by the laws they have violated and denounced, they will scorn the widows and orphans their treachery has made, and again will they strike down any representative who in these Halls dares to point out their crime. You will talk of the high mission and glory of the nation, while rebels stand, by your permission—nay, with you sanction; ah! with still more, your protection—with one hand on the throat of their slaves who are patriots, and with the other tears the flag which is the emblem of our national honor. You see this, you know it; the world sees it and condemns it; all civilized men pity you, and scorn the imbecility which permits it. You endorse the proclamations of generals in favor of protecting slavery. At this moment we are asked to endorse and make a law of the late jubilant repetition of General Halleck's Order No. 3. You send your sons to fight this war, brought on by slaveholders, for the purpose of permanently establishing slavery on the ruins of our Government. Slaves aid their rebel masters in every species of the labor of war, and procuring supplies for their armies. You listen to, and endorse the proclamations of those generals who avow that this relation of master and servant, even of rebels, shall not be molested; protecting, by this means, the very forces you are warring, and holding the enemies' weapons at the heart of our friends.

Not only so, but the slaves themselves are loyal, and would be true to our flag and people. To endorse slavery is a mark reckless enough in this age of civilization; but for freemen to aid in holding those persons in bondage to the traitors of the country, men whom we despise and loathe, is a degree of ingratitude which the negro himself will pity in us, and feel proud that he is a slave. It is not enough



that the nation has lost over twenty thousand of her brave sons by death in hospital and battle-field; that Rachel is weeping for her children, and will not be comforted, because they are not; that the blood of those four hundred and eighty brave young men stained the ensanguined field of Manassas; that the disgrace of that struggle has severely rebuked our wonted prestige in war; that we have spent in this causeless rebellion over \$600,000,000, and with the inevitable necessity before us of spending hundreds of millions more; that the Ball's Bluff murder is but a part of this accursed tragedy, where treason and treasonable blunders murdered by the hands of slavery's maddening demons a brave and loved officer and a thousand pure patriots; that at Springfield, Lyon and his men struggled against a fearful and hellish power, until, outnumbered, he and hundreds of his soldiers lay down, for the last time, and their dead and mangled bodies become prisoners to traitors, who could not conquer them while living. It is not enough that at Rich Mountain, Cornifex Ferry, Belmont, Frederickton, Lexington, Springfield, Roanoke, Forts Henry and Donelson, our brave brethren fell murdered by traitors, for slavery; but these same traitors are to be protected and apologized for here, and the man who dared to proclaim their property confiscated to the public use, and their slaves freemen, is hunted down through every avenue which human ingenuity can invent, prompted by the most remorseless desire to fasten on us and continue this cause and origin of all our woes. Of history we learn nothing; our own we do not study. We blindly sit here while the vortex is opening again to receive us. The blood of our people, the tears of our widows and orphans, the sword of the army, and the Congress of the nation, all fail to do a simple act which God has warned us, through lamentations and sorrow, is our duty to mankind and to Him. But in face of all this, we support those who, with vulture eye, have hunted the friend of freedom to his fall, and have divided his garments.

The charge of inefficiency was too shallow a pretext to deceive any one, more especially the Western people, who bore witness to his trials and his efforts, as well as the results of his labors in his extensive department, "which was the State of Illinois and the States and Territories west of the Mississippi river and on this side the Rocky Mountains, including New Mexico," and subsequently including a part of Kentucky and the river.

He took command of the Western Department wholly, without special instructions, with full discretionary power to conduct himself under the arduous duties of that position as his judgment should dictate. He entered upon his duties at St. Louis on the 25th day of July, 1861, and found the department in the most deplorable condition, almost without arms and military stores, wholly without money, clothing,

or provisions. From the 6th of June previous Missouri had been in the command of General McClellan, and from the perplexed and needy condition of the Government, had been wholly but unavoidably neglected. Lyon's troops had not been paid or clothed by the Government during the time he commanded them. General Lyon was in the southwest part of Missouri, needing reinforcements. There was trouble in the northwest, requiring more troops than we had there. In the northeast part of the State we had barely enough troops to meet the enemy; while in the southeast, Bird's Point, Cape Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla and St. Louis, with Cairo, Illinois, were threatened by a large force of the enemy, and no adequate preparations made to meet the emergency. The railroads were continually threatened and frequently destroyed—the incendiary's torch performing its office; arms were taken from Union men by squads of rebels all over the State; treason walked on the highways and denounced the flag and Government with impunity. The State was wild with excitement, persons flocking to the rebel standard from the very doors of the Government officers—St. Louis itself seething with treason and rebellion.

"The State government in inextricable confusion unable to lend a helping hand; no arms, no equipments, no horses for cavalry, no large guns for batteries, or small guns for field artillery; all the affairs of the Department in helpless confusion; no system, no money, no officers, and no credit;" the Department entirely neglected by those whose duty it was to provide for it.

The whole country was in commotion. The failures of our army of the Potomac at Bull's Run and Manassas; its retreat on Washington; the surrender of Harpers' Ferry with our arsenal and arms, the machinery of which for manufacture fell into the enemy's hands; the retiring of Patterson from the Virginia shore—had all gone to embolden the rebels, who were then much better armed than were our forces. The authorities at Washington, trembling at the advance of a victorious enemy, who were within sight of the Capitol, were using every effort to make "Washington safe," having but one manufactory for arms left, and but few arms in the arsenals or market, the major part of them having been plundered by Floyd and his traitorous coadjutors, left the Western Department almost destitute.

All the arms which could be procured by the Government were sent to the army of the Potomac. Its money was spent there; its clothing was forwarded and used there; the demand was great and the supplies small. In vain did General Lyon, days and weeks before Fremont's arrival, plead for money to pay his needy troops, and with which to provide commissary and quartermaster's stores. In vain did he ask them to pay the debts he had contracted. In vain did he call for arms and reinforcements. In



vain did he notify the Government that his troops had neither pay nor clothing from the Government during their three months' service—that their families were in want, they dispirited from the neglect and unwilling to re-enlist on account of it. In vain did Fremont plead for arms. In vain did he ask for money and military stores; compelled to contract loans on his own responsibility to pay troops and furnish troops and arms. In vain did he inform the Government that his troops were mutinous and those whose times were expiring unwilling to re-enlist on account of the failure to pay. He importuned until a Cabinet officer wrote to him that he could get no attention to the West or Western matters; that he must take every needful responsibility to save the people over whom he was specially set.

Such are the ordeals through which Lyon and Fremont passed, and paved the way to others' honor and renown.

When General Fremont took command of the Western department, there were less than twenty-five thousand troops in the entire command; of which forces ten thousand were three months' men, all of whose time expired within ten days after his arrival, leaving him some fifteen thousand in all that vast department. Of the whole forces, Lyon had near one-third at Springfield; the remainder were with Pope in North Missouri; Prentiss, Cairo; Lawler, Bird's Point; Bland, Pilot Knob; Wyman, at Rolla; Shrifel, Lexington; Stephenson, at Booneville; Smith and Marsh, at Cape Girardeau; and Burnstine, at Jefferson City; with a remnant at St. Louis; all the Missouri troops poorly clothed, not paid, some of them badly armed, and dispirited; whilst, as I have said, the enemy, buoyant with hope, had over sixty thousand men in the field, and their forces fast augmenting.

Pillow, in southeast Missouri, 17,000; Hardee, near Greenville, 7,000; Price, southwest, threatening Lyon, with near 30,000; Harris, in northeast, with 1,600; Green, in northwest, with over 1,500; Thompson and Watkins, near Girardeau, 5,000; making a total of 62,100.

The enemy had cavalry and large amounts of artillery; while the Federal forces were without cavalry and but little artillery; the whole State in revolt, and the young men joining the enemy. General Fremont, fully anticipating the wants of his vast department, and well knowing the needs of the Government, with its disposition to call arms, ammunition, and supplies to Washington, on receiving information, while in this city, from Governor Yates of Illinois, that he had seven thousand men ready to march, only that they were without arms, called on General Ripley, of the Ordnance Department, and obtained a promise that, out of twenty-five thousand stands of arms then on hand, seven thousand stands should be immediately forwarded to the West for those troops. On the next day, Ripley informed General Fre-

mont, at New York, that the Governor of Illinois must be mistaken in wanting arms, and that they could not be had. Of this he notified the President through the Postmaster General, who informed him that the President would in person attend to this matter; which he did by the appointment of Major Hagner to assist General Fremont in procuring arms by purchase for the West. And, notwithstanding this precaution and kindness by the President, the arms and supplies purchased for the West were sent by Hagner to Washington for the army of the Potomac as appears in the committee's report of Hagner's testimony. Not over about 2,000 stands of arms came from Hagner to Fremont.

Another ruse played on Fremont was to send an order, dated July 24, 1861, for five thousand stands of arms on the arsenal at St. Louis, when there were none there to fill the order.

Large amounts of those that were there in the spring of 1861 were rifled and repaired, under the supervision of this same Major Hagner, who then had charge of the arsenal, and delivered to General Buckner, which have been used against our troops in Kentucky, until captured by the forces under Generals Grant, Wallace, McClernand, and Smith, and Commodore Foote, which is a part of the army raised by General Fremont. On his arrival in the West, the Government was almost destitute of supplies, being compelled to send her agents into the open market to purchase for the Potomac army. Different Governors also had their agents in the market, purchasing supplies for their respective States; all of which were competing with each other, raising the prices at times to much more, and seldom at as little as the real peace price of the arms and munitions of war. To show the House the very high prices which arms and ammunition reach in times of war, in Governments where as in this country, ample national factories have not been constructed and in use, I will read from a treatise on the rise in prices in arms and ammunition in England during the Crimean war:

"When a sudden demand arose for an enormous supply of the munitions of war, not only were private establishments unable to provide them in sufficient quantities, but those that were supplied were produced at a cost considerably beyond, and in some cases of four and five times their value, and of a quality so inferior as to involve great risk of the failure of military operations.

"The shells for which the contractors during the late (Russian) war charged \$324 per ton, are now produced in the Government factories for \$68 per ton."

It was during such a struggle for arms that General Fremont was compelled to enter the market without money to compete with the United States and the several States in the purchase of arms for his needy department, of supplies for his gun-boats and his mortar-boats, and to equip his land and river forces with a concentration of which to quell a gigantic rebellion in the vast country included in his



command. He could not advertise, for he had no money to pay for what was required. He could only get what people were willing to let him have upon credit. And it is worth while naming, in this connection, that the Government is at this moment refusing to pay for the supplies thus furnished.

At this moment, and ever since the removal of General Fremont, an illegal committee, presided over by the man most instrumental in the procuring of General Fremont's removal, and violently opposed to him politically, has been sitting in inquisition upon his administration at St. Louis—annulling contracts. I repeat, *annulling contracts*. The Essex, which, since before the battle of Belmont, has been active in protecting Kentucky, and bore a distinguished part in the victories which have gladdened and revived the loyal part of the nation—that very Essex, costing much less than half the price of the gun-boats built by Government—delivered to the Government completely finished and furnished, not only with every article of necessity, but even of comfort, including the cabin furniture of the officers and crew—put on board and paid for by the private means of the officer employed to build her, (Captain Adams;) even for this they have refused to pay, but struck off two-thirds from the fair and reasonable cost, and that upon the full and detailed exhibition of the most satisfactory vouchers. And this, because this boat was built under the orders of General Fremont. Compelled to strike a bargain wherever he could, he offered—single-handed—the credit of the Government, and plead his pressing necessity as an excuse for the offer; and though thus burthened with duties which belong to the Government, and which for all her other generals except Lyon she has performed, he procured his arms and supplies, equipped and managed his army, throwing his forces along those vast distances, quieting and controlling the rebellion, repairing railroads and building bridges, and discharging all the duties of officers of armies organized, *and which do not move*, in addition to those services of which I have spoken. And yet we are told he is inefficient. By whom? Why, sir, by that cabal which has pursued him because of his proclamation, in which are the friends of that institution of slavery here held above the peace of families, the desolation of societies and States, the sacrifice of property, and the lives of free men; a cause whose advocates find no sorrow or shame in marshalling its hosts for strife and blood against the Government, its law, peace, and citizens.

General Fremont is always successful when pursuing the dictates of his own judgment, which early pointed out the necessity of having gun-boats and mortar-boats to use on the rivers in connection with his land forces. He had such constructed, the first under the supervision of the brave and competent Commodore Foote, who commanded them with honor to himself

and the country; the mortar-boats by that most excellent officer and gentleman, Mr. Adams. I clip the following just remarks from the New York Times relative to these boats:

"Speaking of the success of Foote and Porter, does it occur to you to look back and give credit where credit is due, to the man who planned the enterprises which have yielded such abundant returns? Do you recollect that among the first charges that were brought against Fremont was the one that he was wasting money in building gun-boats to be used on the Western rivers, and that an unending flood of ridicule and abuse was heaped upon what was called 'his visionary scheme?' Fremont has not been permitted to reap the full harvest of the seed he planted; but the future will know that for the fall of Fort Henry, and probably for the ultimate reduction of Columbus and the clearing out of the Mississippi, the nation will be indebted to General Fremont's foresight and adaptation of means to an end. The campaign of the West is coming back to the lines upon which Fremont stood when his triumphant career was cut short. Thus time and circumstances are vindicating him, almost before the ink is dry upon the paper that doomed him to inaction, and for a time to public censure."

After General Fremont had well secured his outposts, and fortified them, with the fortifications of St. Louis in an advanced state, he moved his forces to the towns of California, Tipton, Syracuse, Sedalia, and Georgetown, his headquarters to Jefferson city, thence to Tipton, intending to move in pursuit of the army under Price, in seven divisions, under Generals Sigel, Asboth, McKinstry, Pope, Hunter, Sturgis, and Lane; in all near forty thousand men.

On the 11th of October, Secretary Cameron and Adjutant-General Thomas reached St. Louis, as I learn from their published journal of events, so injudiciously given by Thomas to the country, and after examining the fortifications there, reached Tipton, where I saw the Secretary, on Sunday the 13th of the same month, reviewing a portion of the troops there and in Syracuse, leaving the same day, and on the 14th ordered the work on the fortifications at St. Louis to be stopped. This was done without notice to Fremont. And at the time Messrs. Cameron and Thomas were in his camp, they were the bearers of an order to relieve him of command, dated October 7th, six days prior to their visit. Yet they did not serve the order or inform the General that such was in being. This order was left in St. Louis, in the hands of inferior officers, and General Fremont permitted to march South with his forces in pursuit of Price, which he did with the full knowledge of Secretary Cameron and Adjutant Thomas, on the morning of the 14th. On the morning of the 16th, two days after, Fremont left the railroad at Tipton, the VAN WYCK committee commenced its investigations at St. Louis. And the order for the relief of General Fremont from command was changed from the 7th to the 24th of October, as will appear by reference to the instrument itself. The committee closed their testimony on the 29th, five days after the alteration of the date of the order—which, thus mutilated by irresponsible hands, was served on him at Springfield, November 2d, one hundred and thirty miles from where Secretary Cameron left him. The order to relieve General Fremont was signed by Gen-

eral Scott, and before it was served on him, which was 26 days after its first, and 9 days after its last date, General Scott had retired from service, and General McClellan was Commander-in-chief; and so strangely was this business transacted, that General McClellan on the 2d of November, the same day that General Fremont was relieved at Springfield, Missouri, issued an order at Washington, directing him what course to pursue with his army. This was duly received on the 4th, by General Fremont, two days after its date, on his way to St. Louis, in obedience to the prior order.

This is the most singular conduct ever emanating from any department of any Government. Let us review it. An order to relieve the Major General commanding the Western department is issued and signed by the Commander-in-chief, October 7; is carried by the Secretary of War and his Adjutant General to the camp of the commanding general, six days after its date, and knowing that he is intending to move with an army of forty thousand men, in pursuit of an enemy in the field, with all the equipments for war, do not serve the order or prevent the movement of the army. After he has gone from the last point of prompt communication, they stop the work on the fortifications ordered by him prior to starting. Two days after this an investigating committee, which was appointed by Congress sixteen days before Major General Fremont entered on his duties (and, notwithstanding this committee was appointed at the instance of the chairman to examine the Secretary's conduct, then challenged by him as imprudent and unjust,) commence an investigation of this new department, without notice to the General of its purpose, gathering its information from his avowed known and personal enemies—the date of the order to relieve changed by irresponsible inferior officers to the 24th of same month. The committee closed their investigation on the 29th, five days after this change of date. The order is not served until the 2d of November, nine days after its last date, and four days after the committee close their testimony, when an order from McClellan reached Warsaw, Missouri, in two days. The trip can be readily made from St. Louis to Springfield in three days, being 160 miles by railroad and 130 by good wagon road. The investigating committee commenced its labors two days after he started from the railroad, and left before he returned. And the Commander-in-chief did not know that a Major General was relieved twenty-six days after the order issued.

Whether this singular coincidence was, by the committee, recognised at the time, I do not know; but that no man's good name should be assailed in his absence, without notice, has been settled as good law.

And that a commander-in-chief should learn in less than twenty-six days that an order to relieve a Major General, who was commanding

an extensive department, with over sixty thousand troops, had issued, will hardly need affirmation here.

It will be remembered that whilst he pursued Price with a heavy force, his occupation of Kentucky, at Paducah, Cairo, Illinois, with almost the entire State of Missouri, was fully established and maintained. His removal at the time he had succeeded in concentrating his forces at Springfield, for his certain and swift descent on Price's army, was fatal, not only to him, but to the State of Missouri and the country. With an army in high spirits, well disciplined, with some seven thousand cavalry, eighty-six pieces of artillery, and the remainder infantry, abundant trains, with provisions, such as could not be procured in the country, had it not been for two occurrences, which are worthy of notice here, General Fremont would have engaged Price before the order for his relief reached him. One was the swollen condition of the Osage river, over which he threw a trussel bridge 800 feet in length through a deep and rapid current in thirty-six working hours—getting the material from the forest—on which his army passed with all his artillery and stores, and returned again under General Hunter. The second hindrance was the tardy movements of Generals Pope and Hunter.

The country has been informed, by the publication of Adjutant General Thomas's diary of his peregrinations through Missouri and Kentucky, among other and singular things, that for want of means of transportation General Fremont's army could not move at all, which at the date of his report had moved sixty miles from where he saw it, and built a bridge over a navigable river, and moving on; and, secondly, that Generals Hunter and Pope could not do so for the same reason. To disabuse the public mind, I will insert the statement of Col. I. C. Woods, chief of transportation, made to the General, under date of October 18, at Warsaw, showing the amount and character of transportation of each division of the army, except Generals Sturgis and Lane's. The report shows the number of teams, whether Government, hired, or pressed, of each division, at that date:

	Government.	Hired.	
Gen. Hunter.....	205		
Gen. Pope.....	90		
Gen. Sigel.....	102	25	Enough pressed to move.
Gen. Asboth.....	165	15	80 “
Gen. McKinstry..	30		
Col. Marshall....	10		12 “
Maj. Holman....	3		
Maj. Zagonyi....	12		2 “ for band.
Headquarters....	16		3 “
	633	40	97

Yet Pope reached Springfield only on the 2d of November, and Hunter late in the evening of the 3d, and his command on the 4th, where Fremont and the other divisions had been for over a week. And though the roads were good, their teams did not arrive with tents, cooking utensils, and provisions, for some



time afterwards, putting their men to severe and unnecessary exposure, which I saw with sorrow, and of which I have a right and a will to speak of here. A portion of my constituents were in those commands. The neglect was unnecessary, and I am now as I was then, and there stated, firmly convinced that it was done to create distrust in the minds of the troops against General Fremont; and that they *had* teams is further evidenced by their subsequent arrival. The advance divisions saved their men by hauling their knapsacks, leaving them their arms and ammunition to carry—the roads were good. The world may determine whether it was a part of the combination, when they know who took command.

While General Fremont was at Springfield, Price with a much heavier force was at Cassville, and at intermediate points between those places—his advance at one time reaching to Wilson's Creek battle-ground, ten miles from Springfield; his heaviest forces being at Cassville, and McCullough at Flat Creek, nearer our forces. That the armies would soon have met and fought is beyond any doubt, unless Price had again fled; and in that case every preparation was made for a most vigorous pursuit, with ample amounts of stores for the severest campaign. It has been said that Price was not in force and threatening a battle. I shall be willing to believe what such officers as Sigel, Asboth, Albert, and numerous scouts, loyal citizens of Missouri, as well as officers from our camp sent to Price's for the exchange of prisoners, believed to be true. I conversed with them at the time. In this belief, I particularly rely on the statements of General Franz Sigel, whose reputation as a military commander is established both in Europe and America, who had command of the advance, and who used in my presence to Colonels Hudson and Lovejoy, the following words: "I know that we will fight Price in forty-eight hours;" and but for the arrival of Hunter and Pope, and removal of Fremont, it would have taken place. The arrival of two divisions of an army was to Price tangible, and his information certain, that Fremont's forces had reached him; but that General Fremont would be removed at that time, and under the circumstances surrounding him and his army, no man of Price's good sense would believe, even if he had heard it. That Hunter believed the advance of the enemy to be near I am well convinced from the caution he exercised in making a reconnaissance in force to the old battle ground, in which I accompanied him. And, again, only eight days after General Hunter's order to retire with his forces north of the Osage river, Price followed him, and captured part of his train, and for thirty-six consecutive days ravaged all the country south of the Osage, and much of that lying north of it. At the town of Warsaw, where General Fremont crossed the Osage river, and General

Hunter returned on the bridge of which I have spoken, if we are to believe the newspapers, our own officers burned a portion of our quartermaster and commissary stores, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy, so closely were they pursued more than one hundred miles north of Springfield. We all rejoiced over victories made by General Davis, with part of Pope's division, more than one hundred miles north of where Fremont had carried peace and quiet. Sir, the voice of citizens plundered, and the blood of loyal men murdered in all that country by the enemy, after General Fremont's removal, will rise up against those who were engaged in procuring it.

To-day we are again rejoicing over victories of our brave troops at Springfield, and on the exact lines of march which Fremont made and intended to make. These gun-boats and mortar-boats scour the rivers, carrying all before them; the forces organized by him now in Kentucky under the brave Generals Smith, Grant, Wallace, and McClernand; and the forces under General Buell are marching on the identical roads, and taking the same towns, which General Fremont advised the President, by the following letter of September 8, should be secured:

[Private.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

September 8, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: I send by another hand what I ask you to consider in respect to the subject of the note by your special messenger.

In this I desire to ask your attention to the position of affairs in Kentucky. As the rebel troops, driven out from Missouri, had invaded Kentucky in considerable force, and by occupying Union City, Hickman, and Columbus, were preparing to seize Paducah and attack Cairo, I judged it impossible, without losing important advantages, to defer any longer a forward movement. For this purpose I have drawn from the Missouri side a part of the force which had been stationed at Bird's Point, Cairo, and Cape Girardeau, to Fort Holt and Paducah, of which places we have taken possession. As the rebel forces outnumber ours, and the counties of Kentucky between the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers, as well as those along the latter and the Cumberland, are strongly secessionist, it becomes imperatively necessary to have the co-operation of the loyal Union forces under Generals Anderson and Nelson, as well as of those already encamped opposite Louisville, under Colonel Rousseau. I have reinforced, yesterday, Paducah with two regiments, and will continue to strengthen the position with men and artillery. As soon as General Smith, who commands there, is reinforced sufficiently to enable him to spread his forces, he will have to take and hold Mayfield and Lovelaceville, to be in the rear and flank of Columbus, and to occupy Smithland, controlling in this way the mouths of both the Tennessee and the Cumberland rivers. At the same time Colonel Rousseau should bring his force, increased, if possible, by two Ohio regiments, in boats to Henderson, and taking the Henderson and Nashville railroad, occupy Hopkinsville, while General Nelson should go with a force of 5,000, by railroad, to Louisville, and from there to Bowling Green. As the population in all the counties through which the above railroads pass are loyal, this movement could be made without delay or molestation to the troops. Meanwhile, General Grant would take possession of the entire Cairo and Fulton railroads, Pickett, New Madrid, and the shore of the Mississippi opposite Hickman and Columbus. The foregoing disposition having been effected, a combined attack will be made upon Columbus, and if successful in that, upon Hickman, while Rousseau and Nelson will move in concert, by railroad, to Nashville, Tennessee, occupying the State capital, and, with an adequate force, New Providence. The conclusion of this movement would be a combined advance toward Memphis, on the Mississippi, as well as the Memphis and Ohio railroad, and I trust the result would be a glorious one to the country.

Irreperly to a letter from Gen. Sherman, by the hand of Judge Williams, in relation to the vast importance of securing possession in advance of the country lying between the Ohio, Tennessee, and Mississippi, I have to-day suggested the first part of the preceding plan. By extending my command to Indiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky, you would enable me to attempt the accomplishment of this all-important result; and in order to secure the secrecy necessary to its success, I shall not extend the communication which I have made to Gen. Sherman, or repeat it to any one else.

With high respect and regard,  
I am, very truly, yours,  
J. C. FREMONT.

This was before the enemy had occupied them, and they could have been seized without blood. Nashville would have been in our possession by the first of October, and the Union citizens of Tennessee have been saved from the hellish murders inflicted on them. The blood of the murdered of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri, in battle, in the secret places of the mountains, in the prairies and forests, fields, and highways, will, like Abel's, cry to God from the ground for this double murder. The enemies of freedom in the South rose against her friends there, and the enemies of freedom here rose up against their deliverer and destroyed him, cutting off, for a long time, all aid, while the caverns of the mountains echo back the dying shrieks of murdered loyal citizens; and still the combination in full conspiracy coldly calculates upon the flexibility of the American mind, hoping still to mould it for their further use. Fremont was removed because the slave power demanded it.

#### FORTIFICATIONS, ST. LOUIS.

The question of the necessity for the fortification of any point is a military one, to be determined by the officer in command, at the time and place, in view of the surroundings; and whether St. Louis should have been fortified was properly the province of General Fremont to decide; in fact, the committee do not of their judgment attempt to pass upon it, but introduce General Curtice as a witness of different opinion. I must confess that it was with some surprise I read in the report that General Curtice thought the fortifications unnecessary. I perfectly recollect that in conversation with him at his house at the barracks, where he was in command, on the day prior to General Fremont's starting to Jefferson City and Tipton, en route for Springfield and Price, he said to me, that the troops then at the barracks were raw, some of them unarmed, could not defend the city against the attack of an ordinary force, and that the barracks should have been built in the State of Illinois, putting the Mississippi river between them and the enemy. It does seem to me that fortifications were as necessary as this precaution, particularly as troops are to defend against, and not to be defended by the enemy. St. Louis is a large city; it was to Fremont what Washington is to McClellan—his base of operation; that while the Potomac river, a mile in width, forms a protection to

this city, running as it does between it and the enemy's advance, preventing the egress and ingress of spies, St. Louis is on the south side of the river, with its approaches all exposed, and the river a barrier against reinforcements from the loyal States, as certainly as the Missouri river was to General Sturges, who was unable to aid Mulligan, though only the river between them, and the remainder of General Stone's command when Baker fell. Yet not only General Scott and General McClellan thought it necessary to fortify Washington, but this Congress at its special session, and this one, have voted directly for that purpose many hundred thousands of dollars. Is property in Washington, the lives of her people, or the cause of justice, or duty of her military officer to maintain it, more sacred or more binding than in St. Louis?

The committee affirm that the soldiers should have built those fortifications. These were in all a heavy work. It was warm weather; the climate, as has been clearly proven, not congenial to the Northern soldier until acclimated. But the strongest reason was that the troops at St. Louis were received raw and generally unarmed. They were necessarily equipped and drilled as soon as possible and thrown to the outposts. This was the continued and necessary practice at that point. No body of troops were retained after being fully armed and equipped; and, indeed, necessity sent many to outposts not well armed and drilled. The Governors of States who came up so nobly to the cause requested in all cases that their troops be not thrown into active service without drill. Fremont's was not a besieging or a besieged army. He was in command only 100 days, in which time he raised his forces from 15,000 to 62,000, arming, equipping, feeding, and clothing them, attended with the difficulties which I have already named, moving them to and fortifying points distant from St. Louis as follows: Cape Girardeau, 120 miles; Ironton, 80; Bird's Point, 200; Jefferson City, 125; Rolla, 120; and Cairo, Ill., 200, and Paducah, Kentucky, 230; besides moving forces over and quieting all North and West Missouri, watching and repairing railroads through, and holding military occupation of, almost the entire State, moving near 40,000 men 290 miles by way of Tipton to Springfield, guarding the entire country, driving a victorious army before him, and giving peace and quiet to the people except in the south border, and would in a few days have cleared the State of enemies, had he not been removed. If he had simply been stationed with an immense force to guard the city of St. Louis, as has been the case at this city, he could have fortified it as he did his outposts with his soldiers, and, too, without the aid of Congress.

Again: General Fremont found the commerce and labor of the city paralyzed; and much want and suffering; a large number of the laboring people of St. Louis thrown out of employ, dis-



satisfied with the Government, because taught by those wealthy and traitorous scoundrels who had furnished them labor, but now did not, that the Government was the cause of the war and their suffering. The labor on the barracks and fortifications furnished employ for several thousand hands at good wages, and by this expenditure the minds of many men were disabused, and St. Louis now presents the spectacle of poor patriots and wealthy traitors—the entire foreign population loyal. The feud between the German and Irish element when Fremont reached St. Louis was of a character approaching an outbreak. By the expenditure of this money the city was quieted. The fortifications were so built as to command both the city and the approaches to it, including the river above and below it. The city is wealthy, and if it should fall into the hands of the enemy would furnish supplies to their entire army. Their's is a war of robbery; ours of protection. Again: General Fremont needed all his forces, his purpose being, so soon as quiet was restored in the Southwest part of the State by the destruction of Price's army, which in a few days he would have effected, without returning with his army to St. Louis, to have met his combined forces at the river, and with a concerted movement of his Kentucky troops, with his gun-boats and mortar-boats and Missouri forces, to move down the river, leaving St. Louis in charge of troops enough to man her fortifications, it being his grand depot, the centre of travel and trade of the West, approached by seven railroads, three in Illinois and four in Missouri, as well as river line between those States, opening to his gun-boats and mortar-boats the Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, Cumberland, and lower Mississippi rivers. Connected as it is by telegraph with the free States and the Capital, he could keep up his lines of communication for all purposes with the granaries of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa. The great free Northwest could pour her troops into his army in any need.

Sir, the life, the spirit, the labor, the plan, and the success of this great Western campaign, is General John C. Fremont's. History and the honest judgment of mankind will give it to him, and he will yet have the reward of his labor, combinations to the contrary notwithstanding.

As a question of economy, the fortification of St. Louis was entirely tenable. That city has a population of 160,000; her best fighting loyal element was already in our lines, away from their homes. They knew the danger, because compelled to quell rebellion at their own door-steps. With their homes fortified, those troops felt that the Government was in earnest, and cared for them; a feeling not so prevalent with many three months' men if we may believe General Lyon, who said they were dispirited and felt they were neglected. Confidence is all and all to fighting men. There is no man who loves his country but who

loves his family; and he who knows that his family is in danger of these murderous slave-drivers, whose course so far is one of robbery and slaughter, treads with unsteady step the path which leads from home; but when he feels *himself* in danger, for the safety of those objects of his hope and affection, he counts no odds, and proudly meets his foes.

But to hold a city of the size of St. Louis without fortification, against forces which could in the rear of an advancing army rise and seize its stores or burn the city, it would require fully ten thousand well armed troops, with costs not varying materially from the following:

10,000 men at wages 43 cents per day.....	\$4,300
“ “ at expense 25 “ .....	2,500
500 horses, for teams and artillery, 20 cents per day	125
	<hr/> 7,925

In addition, it will require 100 wagons and harness for horses, with wear and tear in all, equaling \$8,000 per day.

The fortifications will require less than half that number of men, wagons, horses, and arms.

So that the expense of \$4,000 per day, with a loss of 5,000 men, 50 wagons, 250 horses, and artillery for field service, with arms for all, can be saved by the fortifications, which would be a saving, in fifty days, of their entire cost at the price they were built, not counting the service in the field of the spare forces. Now when quiet is restored it is said they were not needed. It is easy to say that a successful precaution was not necessary.

But what made St. Louis safe? Was it those committees which have followed General Fremont so perseveringly at such respectful distances? Was it the policy which has suffered the Potomac blockaded, both above and below the Capital—the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and canal destroyed—three out of four of the approaches to the city of Washington cut off—which surrenders the Harper's Ferry manufactory of arms and arsenal, with machinery, to the enemy—an army murdered at Ball's Bluff, in sight of their brave and anxious friends, without means of relief—the Capital with 200,000 men beleaguered for six months—was it these? No! no! It was a brave and active army, imbued with the same spirit of freedom which moved him who organized it.

But in addition to the deprivations against which Lyon and Fremont had to contend, of which I have spoken, troops and arms were called from that endangered and needy department, at times, too, when they were most required; compelling General Lyon, at one time, to the unwelcome necessity of refusing to obey the orders of the Government, and withholding troops from superior demand. And as testimony to prove what I have said, I introduce and incorporate in my remarks letters and telegrams, and extracts of each from the correspondence of Generals Lyon and Fremont; and for the further purpose of dispelling the

unjust aspersions, so industriously circulated against Fremont, charging him with a neglect of duty to General Lyon in not reinforcing him prior to the battle of Wilson's Creek, showing by the telegrams of General McClelland and the President their opinions of the importance of holding Cairo and Northeast Missouri, and the necessity of saving this region, which lay in proximity to the river and State of Kentucky, which would, in the hands of the enemy, directly endanger the city of St. Louis and entire State of Missouri.

These telegrams and official writings will show the following state of facts:

That General Fremont\* took charge of his command July 25, 1861.

That it was imperatively necessary to reinforce Cairo.

That the enemy's forces far exceeded any possible numbers Fremont could bring to bear.

That your troops were not fed, paid, or clothed, by the Government, while Lyon was in command.

That General Lyon made urgent requests for them.

That drafts were made on him for troops until he finally refused to obey the order.

That General Fremont reinforced Cairo on the 2d of August, which was as soon as possible.

That the department was destitute of money or supplies.

That Government would not pay attention to his urgent requests more than it did Lyon's.

That General Fremont ordered troops to General Lyon, August 3d, seven days prior to the fight at Wilson's Creek, which was August 10.

That General Lyon notified Fremont that, in case of failure to reinforce him, he would retire.

That a failure to reinforce Cairo would have lost the State, with St. Louis, and not have saved Lyon, because he would have been surrounded.

That there was not armed troops enough to reinforce both.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF OHIO,  
Cincinnati, June 18.

Have received order placing Missouri under my command. Will leave for St. Louis to-morrow. If more troops are needed telegraph me details of case.

G. B. MCLELLAN, Major Gen.

CHESTER HARDING, Jr., Asst Adj't General.

BOONEVILLE, Mo., July 2, 1861.

DEAR COLONEL: I hope to move to-morrow, and think it more important just now to go to Springfield. My force in moving from here will be about 2,400 men. Major Sturgis will have about 2,200 men, and you know what force has gone to Springfield from St. Louis, so that you see what an amount of provisions we shall want supplied at that point; please attend to us as effectually as possible. Our line should be kept open by all means. I must be governed by circumstances at Springfield. You will of course have due attention to the Southeast. *The State Journal* is outrageous and must be stopped; you will take such measures as you think best to effect this. Our cause is suffering from too much indulgence, and you must so advise our friends in St. Louis. Col. Stevenson must have pretty strong garrisons at the points he occupies on the river, and he must have support from other States as occasion seems to require. Col. Curtis is, I suppose, on the

Hannibal and St. Joseph road; rigorous measures should be shown the disorderly in that region. Our operations are becoming extensive, and our staff officers must keep up with our emergencies. We need here a regular Quartermaster and Commissary. Cannot something be done for us from Washington? Yours truly,

Col. HARDING, St. Louis Arsenal.

P. S. I cannot spare more than 300 stand of arms for Home Guards at Jefferson. I shall not be able to supply other portions of the State with the same proportion.

N. L.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OHIO,  
Buckhannon, July 5, 1861.

Communicate freely with Prentiss. If he does not need Wyman you can take him. Telegraph to Gen. Pope, at Alton, to give you a regiment, and to Harlbut, at Quincy, to give you another.

Do not lose sight of importance of Cairo, and of its operations in Southeastern Missouri. Write to me fully.

G. B. MCLELLAN, Major Gen. U. S. A.  
To CHESTER HARDING, Asst. Adj. Gen.

HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST EXPEDITION,  
Springfield, Mo., July 13, 1861.

SIR: I arrived at this place early this evening, two or three hours in advance of my troops, who are encamped a few miles back. I have about 5,000 men to be provided for, and have expected to find stores here, as I have ordered. The failure of stores reaching here seems likely to cause serious embarrassment, which must be aggravated by continued delay, and in proportion to the time I am forced to wait for supplies. \* \* \* \* I shall endeavor to take every due precaution to meet existing emergencies, and hope to be able to sustain the cause of the Government in this part of the State. But there must be no loss of time in furnishing me the resources I have herein mentioned. I have lost in reaching this place about four days time, by the high waters in Grand and Osage rivers, which made it necessary to ferry them. The same difficulty prevented Sturgis from co-operating with Sigel in time to afford any aid. Please telegraph to McClellan and to Washington anything in this letter you deem of importance to these Headquarters. Shoes, shirts, blouses, &c., are much wanted, and I would have you furnish them, if possible, in considerable quantities. Yours truly,

N. LYON, Brig. Gen. Commanding.

Col. CHESTER HARDING, St. Louis Arsenal.

ST. LOUIS ARSENAL, July 15, 1861.

By telegraph from Chicago, July 15, 1861.

Have dispatched condition of affairs to Gen. Fremont, and asked authority to take the field in N. Missouri with five more regiments. Expect answer to-night. Will go down and confer with you as soon as I hear. How did you succeed with Harris?

JOHN POPE, Brigadier General.

To CHESTER HARDING, Jr.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE WEST,  
Springfield, (Mo.) July 15, 1861.

COLONEL: Gen. Lyon is now here with about 7,000 men; of these fully one-half are three months' volunteers, whose term of service has nearly expired—the latest expiring on the 14th of August. Gov. Jackson is concentrating his forces in the southwestern part of the State, and is receiving large reinforcements from Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Texas. His effective force will soon be certainly not less than 30,000 men—probably much larger. All idea of any further advance movement, or of even maintaining our present position, must soon be abandoned, unless the Government furnish us promptly with large reinforcements and supplies. Our troops are badly clothed, poorly fed, and imperfectly supplied with tents; none of them have yet been paid, and the three months' volunteers have become disheartened to such extent that very few of them are willing to renew their enlistment. The blank pay rolls are not here, and the long time required to get them here, fill them up, send them to Washington, have the payment ordered, and the Paymaster reach us, leaves us no hope that our troops can be paid for five or six weeks to come. Under these circumstances, there remains no other course but to urgently press upon the attention of the Government the absolute necessity of sending us fresh troops at once, with ample supplies for them and for those now here. At least 10,000 men should be sent, and that promptly. You will send the enclosed despatch by telegraph to Gen. McClellan, and also to the War Department, and forward by mail a copy of this letter. Lose no time in fitting for the field the three years' volunteers now at the Arsenal, and send them



here as soon as possible. Call for Col. McNeil's regiment of Home Guards, to garrison at the Arsenal, and allow him to organize, if for the regular three years' service, if he desires to do so. It is believed that the remaining Home Guards will be sufficient for the city. Should it be necessary, their term of service can be renewed, for a short period, for the purpose of a city garrison. The General is not aware whether Col. Smith's regiment has yet taken the field; if not, he presumes that both his and Col. Bland's regiments may be sent here without delay. You may doubtless leave the care of the southeast part of the State to Gen. Prentiss. Should St. Louis be in danger from that direction, troops could easily be called from Illinois and Indiana for its defence; moreover, a force moving on St. Louis from the South would be exposed to attack in rear from Cairo. Hence there seems little or no danger from that direction. Unless we are speedily reinforced here, we will soon lose all we have gained. Our troops have made long marches, done much effective service, and suffered no small privations. They have received no pay nor clothing from the Government, and the small stock furnished by private contribution is now exhausted; so that, unless the Government gives us relief speedily, our thus far successful campaign will prove a failure.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
Captain 11th Infantry, Acting Adj. General.  
To Col. CHESTER HARDING,  
Adjutant General of Missouri Volunteers,  
St. Louis Arsenal, Missouri.

P. S. Cannot Col. Curtis's regiment be spared from St. Joseph, and, if so, send it forward.

N. LYON, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS RIPLEY COUNTY BATTALION,  
Camp Burrows, July 16, 1861.

DEAR SIR: If there is any way to communicate with the Governor, through any person in St. Louis, please let me know it. I am advancing and Gen. Yell will follow me in a few days, with 5,000 men. He will take position between Rolla and Ironton, and act as circumstances dictate. Gen. Watkins will move up, sustained by Gen. Pillow, and if proper energy is exercised we can drive the enemy north of the Missouri and into St. Louis in thirty days. You will please let me hear from you, verbally or not, through the person through whom this passes; and please send *The Daily Journal* for a short time to Doniphan, as it will be sent to me by my couriers.

Yours respectfully,

Col. M. JEFF THOMPSON,  
Commanding Ripley Co. Batt.

JOSEPH TUCKER, Esq., Editor *The State Journal*, St. Louis.

DEAR MISS: I have not heard from you yet, but make free to trust this to your care.

SPRINGFIELD, Mo., July 17, 1861.

SIR: I inclose you a copy of a letter to Col. Townsend on the subject of an order from Gen. Scott, which calls for five companies of the 2d Infantry to be withdrawn from the West and sent to Washington. A previous order withdraws the mounted troops, as I am informed, and were it not that some of them were en route to this place they would now be in Washington. This order carried out, would not now leave at Fort Leavenworth a single company. I have companies B and E 2d Infantry now under orders for Washington, and if all these troops leave me I can do nothing, and must retire in the absence of other troops to supply their places. In fact, I am badly enough off at the best, and must utterly fail if my regulars all go. At Washington troops from all the Northern, Middle, and Eastern States are available for the support of the army in Virginia and more are understood to be already there than are wanted, and it seems strange that so many troops must go on from the West and strip us of the means of defence; but if it is the intention to give up the West, let it be so—it can only be the victim of imbecility or malice. Scott will cripple us if he can. Cannot you stir up this matter and secure us relief? See Fremont if he has arrived. The want of supplies has crippled me so that I cannot move, and I do not know when I can. Everything seems to combine against me at this point. Stir up Blair.

Yours, truly,

N. LYON, Commanding.  
Col. HARDING, St. Louis Arsenal, Mo.

By Telegraph from CHICAGO, dated 17th,  
Received July 17, 1861.

We need specially, to fit out one or two regiments of cav-

alry, sabres and revolvers. There are absolutely none in this part of the country.

JOHN POPE,

Brigadier General.

To Maj. Gen. FREMONT, U. S. A., New York.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF WEST,  
Springfield, Mo., July 17, 1861.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of special order No. 112, from Headquarters, under date of July 5, directing the removal from the Department of the West of companies B, C, E, G, and H, 2d Infantry, and of Captain Sweeney, now acting Brigadier General by election of volunteers. The communication reached me yesterday at this place.

I have been drawn to this point by the movements of the rebel forces in this State, and have accumulated such troops as I could make available, including those in Kansas. My aggregate is between 7,000 and 8,000 men, more than half of whom are three-months' volunteers, some of whose term of enlistment has just expired; others will claim a discharge within a week or two, and the dissolution of my forces from this necessity, already commenced, will leave me less than 4,000 men, including companies B and E, 2d Infantry, now with me. In my immediate vicinity it is currently reported there are 30,000 troops and upward, whose number is constantly augmenting, and who are diligently accumulating arms and stores. They are making frequent lawless and hostile demonstrations and threaten me with attack. The evils consequent upon the withdrawal of any portion of my force will be apparent; loyal citizens will be unprotected, depressed treason will assume alarming boldness, and possible defeat of my troops in battle will peril the continued ascendancy of the Federal power itself, not only in the State, but in the whole West. If the interests of the Government are to be sustained here, and in fact in the whole valley of the Mississippi large bodies of troops should be sent forward to this State, instead of being withdrawn from it, till by concentration there may be ability to overpower any force that can be gathered in the West to act against the Government. Troops properly belonging to the valley of the Mississippi from Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio, have already been withdrawn to the East. The moral effect of the presence of the few regulars in my command is doubtless the main consideration that holds the enemy in check, and with them I may be able to retain what has already been achieved until I am strengthened; but any diminution will be imminently hazardous.

The volunteers with me have yet had no pay for their services, and their duties have been arduous. Their clothing has become dilapidated, and, as a body, they are dispirited. But for these facts they would probably nearly all have re-enlisted. I have no regular officers of the Pay Department, nor the Commissary and Quartermaster; the affairs of both the last are consequently inefficiently administered, from want of experience. Nothing but the immense interests at stake could have ever induced me to undertake the great work in which I am engaged, under such discouraging circumstances. In this state of affairs presumed to have been unknown when the order was issued, I have felt justified in delaying its execution for further instruction, so far as the companies with me are concerned.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. LYON,

Brigadier General, Commanding.

To Lieut. Col. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General, &c.

ST. LOUIS, July 19, 1861.

It was the design to occupy Southwest Missouri, cutting off all approaches from Arkansas by way of Peckham, to occupy Poplar Bluffs, Bloomfield, Greenville, and the line of the Cairo and Fulton railroad—accordingly one regiment is at Ironton, ready to advance when reinforced. Grant was under orders, but his orders were countermanded. Marsh is at Cape Girardeau, instructed to keep open communication with Bloomfield, where Grant was to be. Gen. Prentiss has eight regiments at Cairo, and could spare five of them to go into that country. If we once lose possession of the swamps of that region a large army will be required to clear them, while if we get possession first and hold the causeway a smaller force will go. Gen. McClellan telegraphed that he had authentic intelligence of a large army gathering at Peckham, according with what I have advised for weeks. Expecting you here daily I have not telegraphed before; but if you do not come at once will you take into consideration the importance to Cairo that the Southwest should be held by us?

CHESTER HARDING, Jr.,

Assistant Adjutant General.

To Major General FREMONT.

St. Louis Arsenal, July 20, 1861.

By telegraph from Cincinnati, July 20, 1861.

In case of attack on Cairo have none but Illinois troops to reinforce, and only 11,000 arms in Illinois. Will direct two regiments to be ready at Caseyville, but you will only use them for defence of St. Louis, and in case of absolute necessity. Telegraph me from time to time.

G. B. McCLELLAN,

Major General U. S. A.

To CHESTER HARDING, Jr., Assist. Adj. General.

St. Louis Arsenal, July 21, 1861.

A week since Gen. McClellan telegraphed that he had the same definite information of troops crossing from Tennessee and coming up from all parts of Arkansas to Pocahontas, which I had learned from our scouts and spies (one of them a pilot on a Memphis boat which had conveyed some of the troops over,) and had sent to him.

Now, in the Southeast we stand thus: Two regiments, not in communication with each other; no artillery, a few Home Guards, against what they expect to be 20,000 men (regular troops, well provided,) who design marching upon St. Louis.

I have explained all this to Gen. Fremont, who will be here Tuesday, and who (as does Gen. Pope) understands the threatened movement, and will take vigorous measures to meet it.

At home our friends are alarmed, and the city is uneasy. I receive about five deputations per diem, warning me that I ought not to send away so many troops (2,200 U. S. R. C. left) and sometimes hinting that I will be overhauled by higher powers for doing so. The only danger is in case of an advance from Arkansas. But the first demonstration will result in clearing St. Louis of its secession element.

CHESTER HARDING,

Assistant Adjutant General.

To Brig. Gen. LYON.

St. Louis Arsenal, July 23, 1861.

By telegraph from Cairo, 23d, 1861.

Have but eight (8) regiments here. Six (6) of them are three (3) months men. Their time expires this week—are reorganizing now. I have neither tents nor wagons, and must hold Cairo and Bird's Point. The latter is threatened. I have but two guns equipped for moving. Thus you see I cannot comply with request. Again, news of this morning changes policy of rebels in Kentucky. They are organizing opposite. Watkins is encamped with 2,000 seven miles from Bloomfield. He has no cannon, and poorly armed. This may be the force you have heard from.

B. M. PRENTISS, Brig. Gen.

To CHESTER HARDING.

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1861.

DEAR GENERAL: I have two telegrams from you, but find it impossible now to get any attention to Missouri or Western matters from the authorities here. You will have to do the best you can, and take all needful responsibility to defend and protect the people over whom you are specially set.

Yours, truly, and in haste,

M. BLAIR.

SPRINGFIELD, (Mo.), July 27, 1861.

DEAR SIR: I have your notes about matters in St. Louis, &c., and your proceeding seems to me perfectly correct. Now that matters North seem more quiet, cannot you manage to get a few regiments this way? I am in the deepest concern on this subject, and you must urge this matter upon Fremont, as of vital importance. These three months' volunteers would re-enlist if they could be paid, but they are now dissatisfied, and if troops do not replace them, all that is gained may be lost. I have not been able to move for want of supplies, and this delay will exhaust the term of the three months' men. Cannot something be done to have our men and officers paid as well as our purchases paid for. If the Government cannot give due attention to the West, her interests must have a corresponding disparagement.

Yours, truly,

N. LYON,

Brigadier General Commanding.

To Colonel C. HARDING,

St. Louis Arsenal, Missouri.

[Memorandum by Col. PHELPS, from Gen. LYON, to Gen. FREMONT, July 27.]

See Gen. Fremont about troops and stores for the place. Our men have not been paid, and are rather dispirited;

they are badly off for clothing, and the want of shoes unfits them for marching. Some staff officers are badly needed, and the interest of the Government suffers for the want of them. The time of the three months' volunteers is nearly out, and, on returning home, as most of them are disposed to, my command will be reduced too low for effective operations. Troops must at once be forwarded to supply their place. The safety of the State is hazarded; orders from Gen. Scott strip the entire West of regular forces, and increase the chances of sacrificing it. The public press is full of reports that troops from other States are moving toward the northern border of Arkansas for the purpose of invading Missouri.

To General FREMONT.

St. Louis, July 28, 1861.

I ordered the arms shipped to New York, to my order, expecting to forward, on the arrival, to my department. I trust you will confirm this disposition of them. The rebels are advancing in force from the South upon these lines. We have plenty of men, but absolutely no arms, and the condition of the State critical.

J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Com'g.

To Hon. W. H. SEWARD, Washington.

CAIRO, July 28, 1861, (Rec'd St. Louis, July 29, 1861.)

On yesterday 3,000 rebels, west of Bird's Point 40 miles; 300 at Madrid, and three regiments from Union City ordered there; also troops from Randolph and Corinth. The number of organized rebels within 50 miles of me will exceed 12,000—that is including Randolph troops ordered, and not including several companies opposite in Kentucky.

B. M. PRENTISS, Brig. Gen.

To Maj. Gen. FREMONT.

St. Louis, July 29, 1861.

The agent of Adams' Express Company here has offered to bring me by passenger train any arms directed to me. Send everything you have for me by passenger trains, for which the Express Company will provide. Your letter of 24th received. There were no arms at the Arsenal here to meet the order given for the 5,000. We must have arms—any arms, no matter what.

J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Com'g W. D.

To Maj. HAGNER, Fifth Av. Hotel, New York.

[Un official.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

St. Louis, July 30, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: You were kind enough to say that as occasions of sufficient gravity arose I might send you a private note.

I have found this command in disorder, nearly every county in an insurrectionary condition, and the enemy advancing in force by different points of the southern frontier. Within a circle of 50 miles around General Prentiss, there are about 12,000 of the Confederate forces, and 5,000 Tennesseans and Arkansas men, under Hardee, well armed with rifles, are advancing upon Ironton. Of these, 2,000 are cavalry, which yesterday morning were within twenty-four hours march of Ironton. Colonel Bland, who had been seduced from this post, is falling back upon it. I have already reinforced it with one regiment sent on another this morning, and fortified it. I am holding the railroad to Ironton and that to Rolla, so securing our connections with the South. Other measures, which I am taking, I will not trust to a letter, and I write this only to inform you as to our true condition, and to say that if I can obtain the material as I am expecting you may feel secure that the enemy will be driven out and the State reduced to order. I have ordered General Pope back to North Missouri, of which he is now in command. I am sorely pressed for want of arms. I have arranged with Adams' Express Company to bring me everything with speed, and will buy arms to-day in New York. Our troops have not been paid, and some regiments are in a state of mutiny, and the men whose term of service is expired generally refuse to enlist. I lost a fine regiment last night from inability to pay them a portion of the money due. This regiment had been intended to move on a critical post last night. The Treasurer of the United States has here \$300,000 entirely unappropriated. I applied to him yesterday for \$100,000 for my Pyramter, General Andrews, but was refused. We have not an hour for delay. There are three courses open to me. One, to let the enemy pass as himself of some of the strong strategic points in the State, and threaten St. Louis, which is insurrectionary. Second, to force a loan from securities banks here. Third, to use the money belonging to the Government, which is in the Treasury here. Of course I will neither



lose the State nor permit the enemy a foot of advantage. I have infused energy and activity into the department, and there is a thorough good spirit in officers and men. This morning I will order the Treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to General Andrews, and will send a force to the Treasury to take the money, and will direct such payments as the exigency requires. I will hazard everything for the defence of the department. You have confided to me and I trust to you for support.

With respect and regard, I am, yours truly,  
J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General, Commanding.

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

By telegraph from CAIRO, Aug. 1, 1861.  
The following information just received is, I believe, reliable. Gen. Pillow was at New Madrid on the morning of the 31st, with 11,000 troops well-armed and well-drilled; two regiments of cavalry splendidly equipped; one battery of flying artillery, 10 pounders and ten guns manned and officered by foreigners; several mountain howitzers and other artillery, amounting in all to 100 9,000 m. re moving to reinforce. He has promised Gov. Jackson to place 20,000 men in Missouri at once. I have a copy of his proclamation and also one of his written passes.

C. C. MARSH,  
Col. Commanding Camp Fremont.  
To Major Gen. FREMONT, St. Louis.

Upon this day, August 1, Gen. Fremont went in person to reinforce Cairo, with what troops he could gather, and with as much display as possible, in order to increase the apparent size of his small force.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, Aug. 2, 1861.  
Since ordering the two batteries for you yesterday, it appears one company has no guns and the other is in Western Virginia; neither can be withdrawn. The order is countermanded.  
WINFIELD SCOTT.  
To GEN. FREMONT.

[Telegram.]  
HEADQUARTERS, "City of Alton," Cairo, Aug. 3, 1861.  
Order Colonel J. D. Stevenson's regiment to Rolla forthwith. Quartermaster's and Commissary's stores to follow. Use utmost despatch.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General, Commanding.  
Captain J. C. KELTON, Assistant Adjutant General.

[Telegram.]  
HEADQUARTERS, "City of Alton," Cairo, Aug. 3, 1861.  
The Commanding General directs that Montgomery's force join General Lyon's command at Springfield, Missouri, immediately. Send him this order by express.

JOHN G. KELTON,  
Assistant Adjutant General.  
Captain W. E. PRINCE, Commanding Fort Leavenworth.

CAIRO, August 4, 1861.  
Information last night of a large force at Bloomfield, reported from eight (8) to ten thousand (10,000); at Garrison Mills, on Picquet road, five hundred (500); at Castor Mills, five hundred (500); at Strong's Mills on Casting river, five hundred (500); about five miles above Strong's Mills they are herding beef cattle. On 1st and 2d August they had orders to cook four days rations of bread.

C. C. MARSH,  
Col. 20th Ill. Vol. Commanding.  
To Major General J. C. FREMONT.

St. Louis, August 4, 1861.  
Yours of the 4th received to day. See dispatch to President. I have made a loan from the banks here. Send money. It is a moment for the Government to put forth its power.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General, Commanding.  
Hon. MONTGOMERY BLAIR, Washington city.

CAPE GIRARDEAU, Aug. 4, 11 a. m.,  
Via Jonesborough. (received St. Louis, 5th.)  
Thomson is advancing within 16 miles of me. Am fortifying the hill in rear of Mills's. Send me reinforcements and ammunition. Express waiting for reply.  
C. C. MARSH, Col. 20th Ill. Vol., Com'g.  
To Maj. Gen. FREMONT.

CAPE GIRARDEAU, 9 p. m., Aug 5,  
Via Jonesborough.

Enemy close on me, over 5,000 strong. Will be attacked before morning; send me aid.

To Maj. Gen. FREMONT.

C. C. MARSH, Col.

CAIRO, August 5, 1861.  
The following dispatch was just received: "Cape Girardeau, Aug. 4, 11 p. m.—Gen. Prentiss, enemy advancing within 16 miles of me; help me if you can."  
(Signed) C. C. MARSH."

B. M. PRENTISS, Brig. Gen.  
To Maj. Gen. FREMONT.

By telegraph from the ARSENAL, Aug. 5, 1861.  
There are now in the Arsenal 2,933 men, besides Smith's 630 at the barracks. Smith's and Coler's men don't know the facings and marchings. Ought not Color to go to the barracks, and should not the officers of the 13th regulars be instructed to drill both regiments?

CHESTER HARDING, Jr.  
To Gen. FREMONT, St. Louis.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
St. Louis, Aug. 5, 1861.  
1. The commanding officer directs that Col. Montgomery's force joins Gen. Lyon's command, at Springfield, Mo., immediately.  
2. The force under Col. Dodge, at Council Bluff, is ordered to St. Joseph forthwith. On its arrival at that point, the commanding officer of the regiment will report to these Headquarters for orders.

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.  
Forward these orders with the utmost dispatch.  
J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.  
To Capt. PRINCE, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

By telegraph from WASHINGTON,  
August 5, 1861.  
The President desires to know briefly the situation of affairs in the region of Cairo. Please answer.  
JOHN G. NICHOLAY, Private Sec.  
To Maj. Gen. FREMONT.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
St. Louis, Aug. 6, 1861.  
I re-enforce you this morning with a heavy battery of 24's and one regiment. Gen. Prentiss re-enforces you from below. Keep me posted.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Maj. Gen. Com'g.  
To Col. C. C. MARSH, Cape Girardeau.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 6, 1861.  
All the troops are ordered out of New Mexico. The first detachment will leave about the 15th. Volunteers received in New Mexico are reported unreliable in defending the large amount of United States property there. The stores cannot be moved East. There is danger of their falling into the hands of the Texans. Nevertheless, the regulars must come away as ordered. At least two regiments of volunteers, say from Kansas should be sent without delay to New Mexico, with a competent officer for the immediate command of all the troops there. Confer with the Governor of Kansas, and arrange for the safety of New Mexico as soon as possible.

WINFIELD SCOTT.  
To Maj. Gen. FREMONT.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
St. Louis, Aug. 6, 1861.

COLONEL: I send by special engine Mr. Ed. H. Castle, for any information you may have of General Lyon's position. Mr. Castle will inform you of what progress Colonel Stevenson has made, who, with his regiment, is on his way to General Lyon's camp. Communicate to me through Mr. C., who is instructed to return with any information you may have—all of which you may safely intrust to him. Inclosed letters to be forwarded as immediately as possible to General Lyon.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General, Commanding.  
To COLONEL WYMAN, Rolla.

ARSENAL Aug. 6, 1861, (by telegraph from Cairo.)  
I have just ordered four companies with two six-pounders on board steamer, to send. They are no doubt fighting now. See General. If not countermanded will hurry them forward. Marsh has called for help again. Enemy 5,000,

and over. Citizens have left Cape Girardeau. Answer if I must send them.

B. M. PRENTISS, Brigadier General.

ARSENAL, Aug. 6, 1861.

Prentiss telegraphs that hot fighting is no doubt going on at Cape Girardeau, and that he has on board, ready to start, four companies and two six-pounders to go to his aid. He asks if he shall send them. Please answer him. Ought he not to increase the reinforcements. Enemy 5,000 strong.

CHESTER HARDING, Jr.

To Major General FREMONT.

CAIRO, Aug. 6, 1861.

Colonel McArthur, with six companies and four field pieces, left for Cape Girardeau 7½ a. m. Will hurry on trenchments at Bird's Point.

B. M. PRENTISS,  
General Commanding.

To Major General FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 6, 1861.

Orders have been sent Governor Morton to forward five regiments to your department. Hoffman's battery of artillery, from Cincinnati, have been ordered to report to you for orders.

THOMAS A. SCOTT,  
Acting Secretary War.

To Major General FREMONT.

HEADQUARTERS, Aug. 6, 1861.

Heavy battery of six twenty-four-pounders and 1,000 men left at midnight for Girardeau under an experienced officer.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General, Commanding.

To Brigadier General B. M. PRENTISS, Cairo.

BIRD'S POINT, Aug. 6, 1861.

The men want to go home, and if detained much longer the worst consequences may be feared. Their time of service expired yesterday. Provide for their return. They are of little use in their present spirit. I wait your answer.

ROBERT ROMBAUER.

Major General FREMONT.

[Special Order No. 39.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

St. Louis, Aug. 8, 1861.

The Seventh Regiment Missouri Volunteers, Colonel Stevenson, now at Rolla, will immediately proceed to Springfield, to join General Lyon's command.

By order of Major General Fremont.

JOHN C. KELTON,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

St. Louis, Aug. 8, 1861.

Captain Kelton will also order Colonel Stevenson with his regiment, now halted at Rolla, to go immediately forward and join General Lyon.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General, Commanding.

[Rough draft of a letter to Montgomery Blair.]

August 9, 1861.

[The letter as sent does not differ from this in any material point. No copy of it is in General Fremont's possession.]

The greater part of the old troops, especially the foreign element, is going out of service. The new levies are literally the rawest ever got together. They are reported by the officers to be literally, entirely, unacquainted with the rudiments of military exercises. To bring them face to face with the enemy, in their present condition, would be a mere unmanageable mob. I can remedy this if I can be authorized by the President and Secretary of War to select throughout the States instructed men who have seen service. With them I could make a skeleton—meagre—but still a framework on which to form the army. This authority ought to be allowed and the cost of the transportation. Don't lose time, but be quick. I assure you it will require all we can do, and do it in the best manner, to meet the enemy. I ought to be supplied here with four or five millions of dollar in Treasury notes, and the disbursing officers allowed to sell them at the ruling discount.

All such equipments as I can procure abroad in much

less time than I could get them here, I ought to be allowed to send for.

These are my suggestions. They are valuable. Pray act upon them, and what you do, do quickly. It would subserve the public interest if an officer were directed to report to me, to have command of the operations on the Mississippi. Show this to the President. The contest in the Mississippi Valley will be a severe one. We had best meet it in the face at once, and by so doing we can rout them. Who now serves the country quickly serves it twice.

(Signed) J. C. FREMONT.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT.

St. Louis August 13, 1861.

Dispatch received. Our soldiers are not promptly paid, partly from the small force of paymasters in the want of money, which fatally embarrasses every branch of the public service here. I require this week three millions for Quartermaster's Department.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General Commanding.

Hon. THOS. A. SCOTT, Assistant Secretary of War.

The following dispatch was sent to Mr. J. T. Howard, of New York, who, at General Fremont's request, was endeavoring to procure certain arms from the Union Defence Committee of that city:

ST. LOUIS, August 13, 1861.

Dispatch received; send the arms without further bargaining, and also send your address. Ship per Adams & Co.'s first freight, who collect here on delivery. Good men are losing their lives while the men whom they defend are debating terms. Answer.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General Commanding.

To J. T. HOWARD.

[Vol. 2, p. 79.]

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14, 1861.

On consultation with the President and the Department, it was determined to call upon you for five thousand well-armed infantry, to be sent here without a moment's delay. Give them three days cooked rations. This draft from your forces to be replaced by you from the States of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, &c. If many men have you under arms in your district? Please answer fully and immediately.

SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.

To Maj. Gen. FREMONT.

[Vol. 2, p. 83.]

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14, 1861.

Detach five thousand infantry from your department, to come here without delay, and report the number of the troops that will be left with you. The President dictates.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

To Maj. Gen. FREMONT,

[Vol. 2, p. 76.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

St. Louis, Sept. 14, 1861.

I am preparing to obey the orders received this evening for the five regiments.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General Commanding.

To Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assist. Adj. Gen.,  
Washington city.

[Vol. 2, p. 82.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

St. Louis, Sept. 14, 1861.

I am preparing to obey the orders received this evening from the Secretary of War for five regiments. I also send messenger.

J. C. FREMONT,  
Major General Commanding

To Gen. THOMAS, Adj. Gen., Washington city.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT

St. Louis, Sept. 17, 1861.

Captain: The General directs me to say to you that Major Farrar, late of Gen. Lyon's staff, states: publicly in the city that he came to these headquarters and applied for reinforcements for General Lyon; that the reinforcements were refused, and that from the manner of refusal the intention was to leave Gen. Lyon to his fate. What are the facts in the case? Respectfully,

J. H. EATON,

Major U. S. Army, and M. S. Captain J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.



To which Capt. Kelton replied as follows :

SEPTEMBER 21, 1861.

MAJOR: Your note was not read till this moment. I have no recollection of Major Farrar bringing application for re-enforcements to Gen. Lyon. That every effort was made to send Gen. Lyon additional troops, after the arrival of Gen. Fremont, I do know. It was found impossible to do so and keep open the railroad communication extending toward Springfield, and at the same time to meet the threatened advance up the Mississippi. I do not know anything of the manner in which the refusal to send reinforcements was made. I can only recall, now, Major Farrar in connection with his application to me for a pass over the Pacific Railroad for his horses, which I declined after the Quartermaster had informed me it could not be authorized. If I had any conversation with Major Farrar on the subject to which your note alludes, it has escaped me entirely.

Very respectfully,

JOHN C. KELTON,  
Late A. A. G., Col. 9th Reg. M. V.

The following is an extract from a statement voluntarily drawn up and offered to General Fremont, by Colonel Chester Harding, Assistant Adjutant General to General Lyon :

PACIFIC, Oct. 5, 1861.

\* \* \* \* \* Looking, then, to the position of affairs in this State on the 26th July, 1861, it will be found that Gen. Lyon was in the southwest, in need of reinforcements. There was trouble in the northwest, requiring more troops than were there. In the northeast there were no more troops than were required to perform the task allotted to them, while in the south and southeast there was a rebel army of sufficient force to endanger Bird's Point,

Cape Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla, and St. Louis, and no adequate preparation was made to meet it.

Gen. Fremont sent the 8th Missouri to Cape Girardeau, and the 4th U. S. Reserve Corps (whose term of service was to expire on the 8th August) to reinforce Bland at Ironton. He took some of Gen. Pope's force from him, added to it two battalions of the 1st and 2d U. S. Reserve Corps, (whose term of service was to expire on the 7th August,) equipped Buel's light battery, and started about the 1st August for Bird's Point, with the troops thus collected, being something less than 3,800 men, and being also all the available troops in this region, expecting to find an enemy not less than 20,000 strong.

Subsequent events showed that the rebel force was not overestimated and nothing but the reinforcements sent to the points above named and the expeditions down the river prevented its advance upon them. Common report greatly magnified these reinforcements; and it was generally believed in the city, and no doubt so reported to the rebel leaders, that Fremont had moved some 10,000 or 12,000 troops to the southeast, while in fact he did not have over 5,000 to move, and was not strong enough at any point to take the field and commence offensive operations.

Gen. Fremont was not inattentive to the situation of Gen. Lyon's column, and went so far as to remove the garrison of Booneville, in order to send him aid. During the first days of August troops arrived in the city in large numbers. Nearly all of them were unarmed; all were without transportation. Regiment after regiment laid for days in the city without any equipments, for the reason that the arsenal was exhausted, and arms and accoutrements had to be brought from the East. From these men Gen. Lyon would have had reinforcements, although they were wholly unpracticed in the use of the musket, and knew nothing of movements in the field; but in the meantime the battle of the 10th of August was fought.

CHESTER HARDING, JR.,  
Late A. A. G. upon the Staff of Brig. Gen. Lyon.







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